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LaFONTAINE v. WILSON

RECOVERY OF GAMBLING LOSS BY CREDITOR
OF LOSER
LaFontaine v. Wilson'

The plaintiff, Wilson, brought an action in the nature of
Debt under the Maryland statute 2 to recover some $43,000,
which he had gambled and lost to the defendants, LaFontaine, et al.1 The money had been wrongfully taken by
the plaintiff from his employers.4 The plaintiff had no
record or knowledge of the number of times he had visited
or gambled at the defendant's establishment. Neither the
exact amount of money taken from the employers nor the
exact amount of money lost to the defendant was known;
the testimony was conjectural. In effect the amount of
the deficiency in the employers' accounts was surmised to
be the amount embezzled and lost. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment at $30,000 for the plaintiff, 5 stating
that the present Code provision was unencumbered by the
requirements and restrictions of the English statute," by
virtue of the legislative method of adopting the Code of
1860. The Court upheld a recovery based on uncertain
testimony as to the circumstances of the transactions and
as to the exact amount of the loss; in fact the verdict was
at variance with the alleged loss. The defendant had been
held to be the winner as a result of his counsel's stipulation that the defendant declined to answer an interrogatory as to his ownership and operation of the place of the
alleged gambling. 7 The defense, that the plaintiff did not
have sufficient title to recover, because he was an embezzler, was overruled.
The Court stated that the employer might have sued
the defendant directly in assumpsit for money had and
received or in equity, provided the funds were traceable. 8
145 A. 2d. 729, 162 A. L. R. 1218 (Md. 1946).

" Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 298 provides that "Any person who may
lose money at a gaming table may recover back the same as if it were a
common debt, and shall be a competent witness to prove the sum he lost;
but no person shall recover any money or other thing which he may have
won by betting at any game or by betting in any manner whatsoever."
3 Suit dismissed as to other defendants.
I Plaintiff here had been convicted in the District of Columbia prior to
this suit.
5 Prior to appeal the judgment had been assigned to the use of the employers.
* 9 Anne (1710) Ch. 14, Sec. II, 2 Alexander's British Statutes (2nd ed.,
1912) 932.
7 Conceded to be an admission under Rule 6, General Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Court of Appeals. Md. Code Supp. (1943) 1214.
8 45 A. 2d 729, 733, citing 2 A. L. R. 345, which notes Corner v. Pendleton,
8 Md. 337 (1855), where employer sued winner from embezzling employee
and Court affirmed judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VIII

Even at common law, in most jurisdictions, a principal,
employer, wife, or other owner of money or property could
recover from a winner, where the money or property had
been gambled without consent or authority. 9 The liability
of a winner has been extended by statute in many states,
but there is no uniformity in their provisions. It seems
to be the settled law in Maryland that the loser may recover, regardless of how he obtained the money lost, and
that an employer may recover directly from his embezzling
employee's winner.
The principal case suggests a problem, not yet adjudicated in Maryland, namely, what remedies has a general
creditor where money has been lost by his debtor in gambling transactions? There appears to be no logical reason
why the general creditor should not be able to reach money
lost in gambling. Our statute permits the loser to recover
a gambling loss "as if it were a common debt."'" A chose
in action for the payment of money generally is assignable
in Maryland and the assignee can sue in his own name, if
the assignment is in writing." Other jurisdictions have
upheld the validity of an assignment of the right to recover a gambling loss under statutes similar to the Maryland statute. 2 On the basis of the local statute and de*2 A. L. R. 345.
10
Supra, n. 2.
11Gordon v. Downey, 1 Gill 41 (Md. 1843) held chose in action for payment of money was assignable, citing Md. Laws 1829, Ch. 51 (now Md. Code
(1939) Art. 8, Sec. 1). The decision has been cited with approval in Dakin
v. Pomeroy, 9 Gill 1, 6 (Md. 1850) ; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Flack, 3 Md. 341,
354 (1852) ; Banks v. McClellan, 24 Md. 62, 80 (1866).
Is (a) New YorkMeech v. Stoner, 19 N. Y. 26 (1859) held the right to recover gambling
loss under local statute (See. 994, Penal Laws, Consolidated Laws of N. Y.)
was assignable. The statute read: "any person who shall pay . . . upon
the event of any wager or bet prohibited may sue for and recover . . ."
Judge Comstock stated: "To take money from a person by gaming is, in a
just sense, a wrong done to his estate. It subtracts from the means of
paying his creditors. . . . Such a cause of action according to all the
analogies of the law, is capable of transmission and assignment." This
decision was followed in Zeltner v. Irwin, 21 Misc. Rep. 13, 46 N. Y. S. 852
(1897), which was reversed on other grounds in 25 App. Div. 228, 49
N. Y. S. 337 (1898).
Newhall v. Kerner, 132 Misc. Rep. 750, 230 N. Y. S. 319 (1928) held that
the receiver of a trust company could recover funds lost In gambling by
embezzling treasurer.
Marett v. Shannon, 164 Misc. Rep. 790, 300 N. Y. S. 1248 (1936) held that
the receiver appointed in a Supplementary Proceeding could recover from
the betting commissioner money lost by the Judgment debtor.
Bamman v. Erickson, 288 N. Y. 133, 41 N. H. 2d 920 (1942) allowed assignee to recover $200,000. lost in gambling by assignor. Issue of case was
whether a habitual bettor (assignor) was a professional gambler, so as to
preclude a recovery.

(b) TennesseeAllen v. Dunham, 92 Tenn. 257, 21 S. W. 898 (1893) upheld the validity
of an assignment by the embezzling-loser and his wife to his employer of
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cisions and the authority of other states' decisions upholding assignments, there being found none which disallowed
an assignment, the loser's statutory right to recover is
probably alienable in Maryland. The old common law did
not favor assignability in general because, among other
reasons, it encouraged litigation and it was believed that
the debtor had chosen a particular creditor and should not
be required to answer to a stranger." Since the policy of
the law in Maryland favors recovery of gambling losses
and frowns on gamblers in general, the common law argument against assignability should carry little weight.
The general rule as to a creditor's rights is that any
asset of the debtor, which he may alienate, can be reached
by the creditor.14 The creditor can employ any of the
usual means of realizing on an intangible asset of his
debtor. Unless the debtor is subject to attachment on
original process, under the rules governing its issuance, 15
the creditor should first obtain a judgment at law against
his debtor. The winner's statutory indebtedness to the
loser-debtor being an intangible is not subject to levy under
a writ of fieri facias issued by the judgment creditor,
The simplest means of reaching this asset would be by an
attachment "at the foot of the judgment", naming the
winner in the gambling transaction as garnishee.'" The
judgment creditor should incorporate a scire facias clause
in the writ of attachment laid in the hands of the garnishee,
whereby the loser-debtor's right to recover from the winner-garnishee can be adjudicated in the condemnation
suit. There are cases in other jurisdictions allowing an
attaching creditor to recover from a stakeholder named as
garnishee. 18
their respective rights to recover gambling losses (here stock speculation
agreement) under local statute ("any person who has paid any money ...
upon any game or wager . . ."). The case Is especially strong in that It
overruled the defendant's contention that such assignment was in effect
compounding a felony (since local criminal statute provided that repayment of the thing would be a defense to embezzlement) or champerty and
maintenance.
132 WrILsTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) Sec. 405.
' GLENN, THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF CREDITORS RESPECTING THEIR
DEmToR's
PRoPERTY (1915) Sec. 2.5.
1
5 Md. Code (1939) Art. 9; 2 Pon. PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF
COMMON LAW (5th ed., 1925) Sec. 502, et seq.
2 Harding v. Stevenson,
6 H. & J. 264 (Md. 1824) ; Poe. op, cit. sutpra
n. 15, See. 640.
17 Poe, op. cit. 8upra n. 15, Sec. 689-90.
10 See 89 Am. Dec. 602 (1866) noting Reynolds v. McKinney, 4 Kan. 94.
which held that where betting is illegal, the stakeholder is a naked bailee
who has received money without consideration. Here the betting debtor
was acting as agent for a third person, yet the court held for the agent's
attaching creditor.
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There are other possible means of attempting to seize
this asset. The judgment creditor might use supplementary proceedings, 9 to reach the assets in the winner's hands.
He might perhaps use a creditor's bill but this may be a
in view of the Court's language in Harper
doubtful remedy
20
v. Clayton.
A trustee in bankruptcy can recover either as representative of the creditors or on the more secure ground as
transferee of the bankrupt's title by operation of law.2 1
There are cases allowing such a recovery.2 2
Thus it seems that either a general creditor or one
representing creditors of a gambling loser can recover from
the winner. This is sound from the standpoint of creditor's
rights in that a creditor should be able to reach anything
a debtor can claim or alienate; and it is sound from the
standpoint of public policy, for, since gambling is generally
recognized as wrong and undesirable, 23 anything which
will render it less secure and less profitable will further
tend to deter the practice. A sense of honor or a fear of
19Md. Code (1939) Art. 75, Sec. 150; Poe, op. cit. supra n. 15, Sec. 707
A-C. By this method, a creditor may petition the court issuing a judgment
(upon showing either that the debtor is concealing or disposing of assets
in order to evade the judgment, or that ninety days has elasped since the
entry of the final judgment or decree and the same remains unsatisfied) to
order the judgment debtor to appear for an examination under oath, and
provision Is also made for examination of third persons who may have
assets or credits belonging to the debtor. The court Is authorized to use
legal and equitable process to subject any assets thus uncovered to the
judgment after notice and hearing to affected persons. The procedure
probably had not been used generally prior to the inclusion of the ninetyday provision, because the court had strictly construed the requirement of
showing a fraudulent concealment. There appears to be only one Maryland case of the Court of Appeals construing the statute, but the provisions
are practically identical with the New York statute, hence the New York
decisions should be helpful precedents.
20 84 Md. 346, 35 A. 1083 (1896) where there was a strong statement that
a Creditor's Bill cannot be used to reach a chose in action which is not subject to execution by a writ of fi. fa. at law. Cited with approval in Harford
Bank v. Banking & Tr. Co., 165 Md. 454, 169 A. 315 (1933).
21 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 70(a) (4) (5) (6) ; 11 U. S. C. A. (1937) Sec.
110(a) (4-6).
22 Brownlow v. Davis, 69 Ga. App. 111, 25 S. E. (2d) 150 (1943) held that
firm trustee in bankruptcy could recover from the winner of fund lost by
one of the partners, stating that the trustee held the firm's title under 11
U. S. C. sec. 110. Brandon v. Pate, 2 H. BI. 308, 126 Eng. Rep. 566 (1794)
held that assignee in bankruptcy could recover from the bankrupt's winner
in a gambling transaction. Cited with approval in Meech v. Stoner, op. cit.
supra n. 12a.
23 6 ENCYLOPEDIA OF RELmIoN AND ETrMcs (1928 ed.) p. 163; KORAN
(translated by E. H. Palmer), Ch. 2 (Of the Heifer) 215 and Ch. 5 (Of the
Table) 95; FAIRCHILD. FURNiSs. BucK. ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS (3d ed.
1936) p. 159; SMITH, WEALTH oF NATIONS, Ch. 10, part 1 (chance of gain Is
overvalued) p. 108; VENLEN, TnE THEORY OF T E LESURE CLASS, Ch. 11.
(II. 6 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1937 ed.) p. 375; 4 UNIvERSAL JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA (1903 ed.) p. 563; Md. Code (1939) Art. 27. Sec. 291-5, Art. 78 B.
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violent retaliation by the winner usually prevents a loser
from enforcing his statutory right. The creditor of the
loser feels no such restraint and, having only an affirmative
selfish interest, is more likely to press a recovery. It is
true that in most instances the creditor will not attempt
to recover from the winner unless his debtor-loser is insolvent, yet every recovery serves the public policy against
gambling, and also allows the particular creditor to have
his claim satisfied.
RIGHTS OF HOLDER OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTOR
AND OWNER OF DETERMINABLE FEE TO IN.
SURANCE PROCEEDS FROM POLICY PRO.
CURED BY THE LATTER
Board of Education v. Winding Gulf Collieries1
Allemannia Fire Insurance Company filed a bill of interpleader on behalf of itself and other insurance companies in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia to determine the proper recipient
of the proceeds of blanket insurance policies. Fire had
destroyed a building on which these companies carried the
risk and the obligation to pay the rightful claimant was
acknowledged. Contestants for the proceeds were The
Board of Education of the County of Raleigh, West Virginia, (hereinafter called the Board) and Winding Gulf
Collieries, a body corporate, (hereinafter called the Collieries). The bases of the Board's claim were that it had
caused the property in question to be insured, that the
policies covered only its interest therein and that it had
paid all the insurance premiums. The Collieries' claim
was grounded on the facts that it had a possibility of revertor in the property' and that the determinable estate
of the Board had ended when the building was destroyed
by fire. The Collieries asserted that its interest was protected under the insurance policies and that it should
1 152 F. 2d 382 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945); cert. den. 328 U. S. 844, 90 L. ed.
943, 66 S. Ct. 1023 (1946).
2In the deed by which the Board took title the following provision appeared after the granting clause: ". . . It is further distinctly understood
and agreed ... that the property hereby conveyed is for public free school
purposes only and for no other purpose or purposes... and that whenever
the said property hereby conveyed shall cease to be used for public free
school purposes, the same and every part hereof shall thereupon ipso facto
revert to and become reinvested in the said party of the first part, its successors or assigns in fee simple, with like force and effect as if this conveyance had never been made."

